Interview : Justin Wolfers by Aaron Steelman
Classical economists such as Adam Smith and John
Stuart Mill were interested in a wide range of issues that
for later generations of economists were thought to 
be largely beyond the scope of their discipline. 
What makes people happy? What gives our lives mean-
ing? How ought we to organize ourselves as a polity?
Relatively recently, a number of economists have 
started to revisit those questions, to place economics
squarely within the broader social sciences, where 
it was once understood to belong, while at the same
time not eschewing the formal tools that have given 
economics so much of its analytical power. The work 
of Justin Wolfers, an economist at the University of
Pennsylvania, exemplifies this broadening scope of
inquiry. As stated on his faculty Web page, his research
interests include labor, macro, political economy, 
economics of the family, social policy, law and eco-
nomics, public economics, and behavioral economics.
One research area not listed is monetary economics.
However, he also has contributed to that field, both
through his academic research and his professional
activities. A native of Australia, he has worked 
at the Reserve Bank of Australia and is currently 
a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco. Wolfers also is a nonresident senior 
fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington,
D.C., where he is co-editor of the Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, and a research associate at the
National Bureau of Economic Research. Aaron
Steelman interviewed Wolfers at his office at the
University of Pennsylvania in May 2010.  
RF: Could you please talk about your work with 
Betsey Stevenson on the recent decline in self-reported
happiness among women? What may explain that drop 
and what does this tell us about subjective measures of
well-being?
Wolfers: We organize the alternative hypotheses into 
three categories of explanations. The first is that women’s 
measured happiness went down following the women’s
movement — and this shows that the women’s movement
was somehow a bad thing. The second is that our finding
tells us something about measurement problems with happi-
ness research. If most of us believe that the women’s
movement was good for women, but the happiness data say
that it didn’t make women happier, then there is a problem
using subjective well-being to measure large-scale social
change. There are lots of versions of this story. One is that
the way women have answered the question over time has
changed. Another may be that when you ask people how
happy they are, they think about it in relative terms. Perhaps
back in the 1970s, women were reporting how happy they
were compared to the lonely housewife next door, and today
they are reporting how happy they are compared to the man
who has the corner office that they should have. Another
version would be that when you report how happy you are,
your report is heavily influenced by those domains of your
life where you feel that you are doing badly. This is Betsey’s
preferred explanation. The number of things that women
are involved in has greatly expanded over time, which means
that there are more chances of failing. The third category
suggests that there is a puzzle for social scientists. We 
simply don’t know why women’s reported happiness has 
fallen following the women’s movement. When you ask
most economists how things have changed for women over
the last 40 years, most will describe it as a triumph for
women. Wages have increased, social and legal protections
have improved, technological change has arguably been 
gender biased in favor of women. The choice set of women
has expanded, and according to neoclassical economics this
is an unambiguously good thing. But it could be that our
finding tells us that there’s some other even more important
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 factor in the background. For instance, declining social
cohesion or rising risk could have had a disproportionate
effect on women relative to men.
Betsey and I are working on another paper that looks at
another great social movement of the second half of the
20th century: the civil rights movement. The women’s
movement coincided with a decline in self-reported happi-
ness. But for African-Americans, self-reported happiness
increased greatly. There was an unconscionably huge gap
between the happiness of blacks and the happiness of whites
in the 1970s. Today that gap is large, but has declined very
substantially. This is interesting, because most of the major
civil rights legislation had already been passed by the 1970s,
the period where the data begin. So it suggests that changes
in attitudes — a decline in racism, for instance — have had a
very positive effect on the lives of black Americans.   
RF: Should policymakers use happiness as a metric
when deciding policy or should they use other measures
that we tend to think of as more concrete and which we
have traditionally considered to be the proper things to
focus on, such as economic growth?
Wolfers:  I think the first piece of advice is that policy-
makers should not abuse happiness research. There was a 
view, for instance, that economic growth was unrelated to
happiness — or actually might impede happiness. That just
turns out to be false. So one useful role of social scientists
here is to knock over canards. That said, I am still optimistic
that there is something useful that can come from happiness
research. (Also, I should note that I prefer the term “subjec-
tive well-being” to “happiness” because I think it gives a
broader measure of how people perceive their circum-
stances.) The female well-being paper suggests that the
trend moved in a puzzling direction during one period of
time. But other results are more conventional. If you look
across countries, it is absolutely astonishing how closely 
subjective well-being tracks objective measures. And if you
look across countries, the correlation between the level of
GDP per capita and the average level of life satisfaction is
about .8, which is one of the highest correlations you will see
in the social sciences. 
In his presidential address this year to the American
Economic Association, Angus Deaton made a somewhat
obvious but important point. What we normally think of as
objective measures of well-being are in some ways subjec-
tive. If we want to compare per capita GDP in the United
States to that in Burundi, it’s easy to measure the number of
dollars, but then we have to compare the different price 
levels. And then do we use the consumption basket of a 
typical person in the United States or the consumption 
basket of a typical person in Burundi? And what is the social
meaning of owning what is considered a pretty standard
good in the United States compared to what is considered 
a luxury good in Burundi? So there is a level of technical 
difficulty in getting these things right.
A related point is that the objections we have to subjec-
tive measures of well-being are often quite similar to
objections we could raise about “objective” measures. How
do we measure subjective well-being? We go out and ask 
people how they feel. How do we measure the unemploy-
ment rate? We go out and ask people. You might object that
happiness is a social construct. But if you ask someone if
they had gone out and looked for work in the last four
weeks, there’s a lot of ambiguity too. Similarly, corporate
profits sound like a pretty objective measure — until you
talk to an accountant. So the value of subjective well-being is
that it measures something we really care about. Those
measures may be flawed and you can point out how they
might be improved, but we should inquire whether people
are satisfied with their lives.
The first generation of people doing subjective well-
being analysis was very motivated by it, and sometimes their
work has the feeling of religious revival. But the second 
generation of people involved in this area of research 
has been able to take a step back and ask some of the 
difficult methodological questions we discussed. But why
should it necessarily interest economists? One answer is
market related: Some people are going to do it. Why not
economists? Our friends in psychology, sociology, and 
political science are doing it. And it’s turned out to have
enormous political resonance; for instance, consider the
Sarkozy Commission. So this will be part of the policy 
discourse and, as economists, we have to decide whether we
are going to be part of that policy discussion. I think we
bring two things to the table. We bring very precise and use-
ful models of human behavior that can help us interpret
well-being data. And we bring some statistical savvy that,
frankly, has been missing.
RF: Your previous answer touches on this, but it may be
useful to ask it explicitly: What do you think of the
Easterlin Paradox — the idea, broadly speaking, that
increases in income are not particularly well correlated
with happiness?
Wolfers: In some sense, we all seem to want the Easterlin
Paradox to be true. We want to think that people are made
happier by seemingly loftier ideals than becoming wealthier.
As I noted, it turns out that it’s just not true. Income has a
huge effect on people’s happiness. 
It’s also been asserted that there is some level of income
that satisfies most people’s desires — and that there is little
point in striving to get above that number because it won’t
make you happier. That number is often given as $15,000
annually. That’s a very widely held view, but as far as we can
tell there has never been a formal statistical test of that view.
So Betsey Stevenson and I went through every data set we
could find to test it, and there is no evidence that an increase
in income — at any point — stops making people happier.
That’s true for the very rich as well as the very poor. A 10
percent increase in income yields the same bump in 
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happiness, whether it’s from $400,000, $40,000, or $4,000. 
RF: You noted in a recent blog post that despite being the
“queen of the social sciences,” books by economists 
are not frequently cited in scholarly journals across 
the board. It is true that the economics profession
rewards publication of a book less than do many other
disciplines — for example, a few good journal articles are
more likely to help an economist get tenure than a book
— but, still, economists do publish books, both with 
academic and large commercial houses. Why do you
think the citation count for those works is relatively low?
Wolfers: I still believe that economics is the queen of the
social sciences. But the metric that leads me to say that is its
influence on the world, which is what I think social science
should be about. When it comes to almost any public policy
problem, you call the economists. This is true in many areas
once thought outside of the domain of economics, such as
family policy and understanding politics. Economists have
been very successful moving into those fields and have 
provided many important insights. 
There are very few economics books that are widely cited
across all of scholarship. The likely explanation for this is the
body that one calls “all of scholarship” is dominated by the
humanities, and people in the humanities don’t cite econom-
ics very often. But the humanities don’t have much
influence, either. There may well be a poet laureate of the
United States, but there is not a Council of Poetic Advisers.
So we are unpopular with those who don’t have much influ-
ence. I don’t see much problem or tension with that.
The broader issue — the reason why I believe economics
is the queen of the social sciences — is this movement of
economics beyond GDP. It is hard not to think of Gary
Becker as the founder of that, and this has been a very good
thing. In sociology, I think our biggest influences have been
on research about family or crime, as economists have done
a lot of empirical work on those topics. With political 
science, on topics from election forecasting to political
economy, we tend to see quite good empirical work from
economists. That’s not to say that we should ignore other
research methods. In fact, I had a sociologist on my disser-
tation committee, Sandy Jencks. I used to joke with Sandy
— and he promised not to be offended — that sociologists
have great questions and economists have great answers. 
What is interesting to think about are the terms of trade
between economics and all these other disciplines. We are
clearly a net exporter to political science and sociology. But
at this point the trade with psychology is almost all one way.
We are a near-complete importer. I wonder why we haven’t
been bigger exporters to psychology. I think it has to do with
the research method. Like political scientists and sociolo-
gists, economists are almost all about the analysis of
observational data. And then there are second-order differ-
ences. Formal political scientists write down a model before
they observe data; informal ones don’t. Ethnographers
observe four people; survey researchers observe 4,000. But
it’s all observational. But when I watch and speak with my
friends in psychology, very little of their work is about 
analyzing observational data. It’s about experiments, real
experiments, with very interesting interventions. So they
have a different method of trying to isolate causation. I am
certain that we have an enormous amount to learn from
them. But I am curious why we have not been able to 
convince them of the importance of careful analysis of
observational data.
RF: Becker and others have long argued that discrimi-
nation is costly to firms and that in order to engage in it
the leaders or shareholders of those firms must have a
“taste” for it. What does your research on the gender
composition of CEOs tell us about that claim?
Wolfers: The standard neoclassical approach doesn’t fully
allow for what I think most people really believe discrimina-
tion to be: a mistake. With mistake-based discrimination,
imagine that you go to evaluate the future profitability of a
firm. One of the things that you are going to look at is the
quality of the CEO. You probably have a mental picture of a
tall white guy in a pinstripe suit, and if the CEO doesn’t fit
that image you may have a less positive opinion of that firm.
If that is true, firms headed by women should systematically
outperform the market’s expectations. The first paper was
somewhat inconclusive; it wasn’t clear whether the firm
overall outperformed expectations. Alok Kumar and I are
working on a follow-up paper that uses quarterly earnings
announcements, which gives us a lot of observations. It
turns out that female-headed firms beat analysts’ expecta-
tions each quarter much more frequently than similar
male-headed firms. If you look at which analysts are getting
things wrong, it’s disproportionately male analysts who have
inaccurately low expectations of female-headed firms.
That’s not true of female analysts; female-headed firms actu-
ally do not beat the expectations of female analysts. This,
then, suggests what we see are mistakes, not tastes. These
analysts do not want to get a reputation for poor forecasts;
they are not trying to lose money. In fact, one of the ways
you can test whether what we observe are mistakes is to ask
people if they would be willing to change their behavior
when presented with the data. And whenever I teach this
paper to my MBA students, many of whom are former ana-
lysts, they say that they are going to change their behavior
when they get back to the real world. So this is just a bias that
is in the back of their minds, and when they understand the
implications of that bias they want to rid themselves of it.
RF: Could you explain what a prediction market is —
and in which areas of business and policy you think that
prediction markets have the most promise? 
Wolfers: It’s simply a betting market, really. You choose 
an event and bet on whether it will occur. The simplest
 example is: Who is going to win the
next presidential election? The value
of this approach is that it is a way of
eliciting expectations. 
Alot of people ask: Are prediction
markets accurate? I think a more 
useful question is: Are prediction
markets better than the alternative?
So, for instance, in presidential elec-
tions are prediction markets more
accurate than the Gallup Poll? The
answer is yes. In nearly every head-to-
head comparison between prediction
markets and some alternative, pre-
diction markets have turned out to
be at least as accurate. 
Still, a lot of social scientists, 
policymakers, and businesspeople
seem reluctant to use prediction
markets. I think there are several
barriers to their adoption. One is
legal. Betting on events is generally
not legal in the United States. So most of the interesting 
prediction markets are operated offshore. Another is that
the United States does not have a gambling culture. In con-
trast, in Australia, my home country, we will bet on virtually
anything. Betting on whether something will happen is 
simply a natural part of our language. Third, in order to 
listen to the results of a prediction market you have to be
willing to accept that the market is smarter than you are.
That requires a lot of humility — and a fair bit of knowledge
of how markets work. When someone asks me who I think
will win the next election and by how much, I look up the
prediction market and I state that number exactly, which
means I have to give myself no credit for knowing anything
about politics beyond that info embodied in the prediction
market price. Most people are not very good at this. They
tend to be confident in their individual ability to predict
outcomes, even in areas where they may not know much. 
In order for prediction markets to be useful in business,
for example, the CEO has to be willing to listen to them, and
CEOs tend to be men of action who are quite reluctant to
admit the limits of their knowledge. Also, think about what
middle management is in most firms. They tend to be infor-
mation monopolists. Their analysts do the research and
report it to them and then they decide whether to present it
to the CEO. With a prediction market, everyone on the
shop floor could give an opinion and that information would
go directly to the CEO. That would undermine middle man-
agement’s role as an information monopolist, so they are
reluctant to adopt prediction markets.
As for where prediction markets are useful, I think there
is a wide range of opportunities in business. Any business
would like to forecast next year’s sales, and it appears 
that prediction markets are very useful at doing that. No
company or policy organization has fundamentally changed
its management or operation struc-
ture by using prediction markets.
But there are some firms like Google
that have people researching predic-
tion markets and use them for some
purposes. In policy, at the Federal
Reserve I assume that Ben Bernanke
has a Bloomberg terminal in his
office and looks at what’s happening
with interest rate futures. What are
interest rate futures? They are a pre-
diction market on the likely path 
of interest rates. Similarly, when
economists at the Fed want to put
together a macro model, they put in
some assumptions about oil prices.
In order to do this, they look at how
oil futures are trading. What are 
oil futures? They are prediction 
markets on the future path of oil
prices. The same is true with foreign
exchange markets and so on. So 
prediction markets are being used, but we don’t necessarily
call them prediction markets in these cases.  
RF: If prediction markets are such a powerful tool, then
why weren’t we able to use them to more effectively see
that, say, the run-up in house prices was unsustainable
or that (related) large problems in the financial markets
were likely?
Wolfers: We should acknowledge that all mechanisms 
of aggregating information are imperfect. So you do see 
bubbles, manipulation, noise trading, volatility, and so on.
Despite that, as an empirical statement, in every head-to-
head comparison, prediction markets tend to do better than
the alternative. As an illustration, I co-authored a paper a
few years ago that looked at a short-lived market called the
“economic derivatives market,” where you could bet on non-
farm payrolls, retail sales, unemployment claims, business
confidence. The way we normally forecast these things is 
we call 30 forecasters and we determine the consensus. It
turned out that prediction markets did a better job than the
consensus. 
Would this be true in housing? I don’t know. We could
run the experiment and find out. Still, we know that markets
were wildly optimistic in predicting the future path of house
prices. But think about the alternative: So were most of the
analysts. If you had surveyed analysts rather than relying on
markets, you would have run into the same problems. So it’s
not clear to me that markets failed us in the case of housing
considering the alternative. They didn’t do a great job, but
they didn’t do worse than the alternative of asking analysts.
The evidence so far suggests that markets are the least
imperfect forecaster. There may be settings where that is
not true, but I have not run across them.    RF
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